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by an in personam action which will not only be free of arbitrary value limits but will be available in all types of actions.
Also, jurisdiction will now be available in many tort actions
against nonresidents who could not be reached under the Corporate Statute. The contacts required when the tort occurs outside the state are no more restrictive than what has been judicially required in the past. The statute as a whole, therefore,
represents a legislative attempt to expand the jurisdiction of
the state courts over nonresidents to the utmost extent which
due process will allow.56

Trusts: Construction of Remainder
Interest of Testamentary Trust
Testator's will created a trust which provided that each of
two beneficiaries was to receive up to $2,000 per year out of
principal and income. The trustee was given sole discretionary
power to terminate the trust when its existence was no longer
justifiable nor practical. No provision was made for the remainder interest in the corpus on the death of the beneficiaries.
In a suit brought by the beneficiaries to compel termination of
the trust, or, in the alternative, to obtain a declaration of the
meaning of the trust instrument, the Minnesota Supreme Court
held, inter alia, that the beneficiaries failed to sustain their burden of proof in urging termination of the trust, that the entire
beneficial interest in the trust corpus passed to the beneficiaries subject only to a postponement of enjoyment imposed by
the trust provisions, and that upon the death of both beneficiaries any remaining corpus should be equally divided between
the estates of the beneficiaries. In re Trust of Tufford, 275 Minn.
66, 145 N.W.2d 59 (1966).
The rule in most American jurisdictions is that if all beneficiaries consent and are under no incapacity they can compel
termination of a trust, provided the continued existence of the
trust is not necessary to carry out a material purpose for which
it was created.' If the provisions of the trust instrument are
56. Majekus v. Walk, Doc. No. 67-268 (D. Minn. 1967), held that
the new statute cannot be retroactively applied.
1. Smith v. National Say. & Trust Co., 245 F. Supp. 532 (D.D.C.
1965); Heifetz v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 147 Cal.
App. 2d 776, 305 P.2d 979 (1959); Guttman v. Schiller, 39 Ill. App. 2d
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ambiguous, extrinsic evidence will be considered to clarify the
2
ambiguity.
The scope of this rule in Minnesota is not clear. The proposition that all beneficiaries can terminate a trust provided its
continuation is not necessary to carry out a material purpose
of the settlor is supported by statute3 and was recognized by
the Minnesota Supreme Court in Simmons v. Northwestern
Trust Company.4 The court in Simmons considerably weakened the rule by expressing doubt as to the propriety of considering extrinsic evidence to ascertain the purpose of the settlor
in creating the trust where that purpose does not expressly or
by fair implication appear on the face of the trust instrument.5
However, in In re Declaration of Trust by Bush,6 the court, in
determining whether the settlor had intended to create a trust,
freely admitted parol evidence for the purpose of interpreting
ambiguous provisions of the alleged trust instrument. The court
ignored the earlier doubts it had expressed in Simmons regarding the admissibility of extrinsic evidence.
58, 187 N.E.2d 315 (1963); Gibson v. Gibson, 122 Ind. App. 559, 106
N.E.2d 102 (1952); Allen v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 319 Mass. 693,
67 N.E.2d 472 (1946). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TRUSTS § 337 (1959);
G. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 1002 (2d ed. 1962); A. ScoTT, TRUSTS
§ 337 (2d ed. 1956); Note, Termination of Trusts, 46 YALE L.J. 1005,
1008 (1937). But see Saunders v. Vautier, 4 Beav. 115, 49 Eng. Rep. 282
(1841) (all beneficiaries can terminate the trust without regard to its
purpose in England); 38 HALSBURY, LAWS OF ENGLAND 883 (3d ed.
1962).
2. Wooster Rubber Co. v. Commissioner,
189 F.2d 878 (6th Cir.
1951); Ingalls v. Ingalls, 256 Ala. 321, 54 So. 2d 296 (1951); Holter v.
First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 135 Mont. 27, 336 P.2d 701 (1959); In re
Hooker's Trust, 233 N.Y.S.2d 947 (Sup. Ct. 1962). See RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) TRUSTS § 337, comment e (1959).

For a general discussion of the problem of interpreting wills and
trusts, see Halbach, Stare Decisis and Rules of Construction in Wills
and Trusts, 52 CALi. L. REV. 921 (1964); Power, Wills: A Primer of
Interpretationand Construction, 51 IowA L. REV. 75 (1965).
3. MIx. STAT. § 501.40 (1965) provides: "When the purposes for
which an express trust is created cease, the estate of the trustee shall

also cease."

4. 136 Minn. 357, 162 N.W. 450 (1917).
5. However, the court in Simmons concluded that since the plaintiff had obtained the entire beneficial interest in the trust property

following the death of the settlor, she could compel termination of the
trust. The court in the instant case read Simmons as holding that
where there is a merger of successive interests following the death of
the settlor there is a presumption that the settlor's sole purpose in imposing the trust limitations was to safeguard the remainder interest.
6. 249 Minn. 36, 81 N.W.2d 615 (1957). In First Nat'l Bank v.

Olufson, 181 Minn. 289, 232 N.W. 337 (1930), extrinsic evidence was
utilized by the court for the purpose of showing an intent by the
testator to create a spendthrift trust.
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In the instant case the beneficiaries presented affidavits in
support of their petition purporting to show that the testator's
sole purpose in imposing the trust limitations was to insulate
the trust funds from the beneficiaries' relatives. 7 The corporate
trustee opposed the proposed termination, urging, without offering any evidence, that the testator's purpose was to protect the
beneficiaries from their financial indiscretions.8 The court, apparently resolving earlier doubts expressed in Simmons, considered the beneficiaries' affidavits but found that they had
failed to sustain their burden of proof. 9 It reasoned that since
the trust gave the beneficiaries the entire interest in the trust
property subject only to restrictions as to the manner of enjoyment of the property, the settlor's intent was to place the trust
corpus beyond the control of the beneficiaries.' 0 The beneficiaries' affidavits were held insufficient to overcome this presumption."
Even where the trustee is given appropriate power by the
settlor, the court will overrule the trustee's decision either to
7. 275 Minn. at 68, 145 N.W.2d at E2.
8. This construction seems doubtful since the beneficiaries were
both responsible middle-aged adults experienced in handling money.
There was no apparent need to protect either one from financial recklessness. Record at 17-20.
9. As authority for placing the burden of proof on the beneficiaries seeking to terminate the trust, the court cited Sherman v.
Hibernia Say. & Loan Soc'y, 129 Cal. App. 795, 20 P.2d 138 (1933);
Cazallis v. Ingraham, 119 Me. 240, 110 A. 359 (1920); Blake v. Johnson,
180 Wis. 485, 193 N.W. 388 (1923). The burden of proof had been
placed on the beneficiaries in Blacque v. Kalman, 225 Minn. 258, 30
N.W.2d 599 (1948).
10. The court concluded that this was a proper purpose, citing
Estate of Easterday, 45 Cal. App. 2d 598., 114 P.2d 669 (1941). There
the court refused to terminate the trust as to a life beneficiary despite
the life beneficiary's acquisition of the remainder and the absence of a
spendthrift provision. However, unlike Tufford where the beneficiaries
appear to be capable of handling money, the beneficiary in Easterday
had a history of financial irresponsibility. Furthermore, there was
ample parol evidence to indicate that the primary purpose of the
settlor in Easterday in creating the trust was to keep control of the
trust property out of the hands of the irresponsible beneficiary during
his life. There is nothing in Tufford to indicate a similar intent by
the testator.
11. The court concluded that the testator probably knew well before his death that there was no danger of the beneficiaries' relatives
receiving any control over the funds in question. The fact that the
testator subsequently failed to make a codicil to his will was seen as an
indication that the purpose of the trust was not solely to keep the control of the trust property away from the wife and the stepfather.
275 Minn. at 72-73, 145 N.W.2d at 64-65.
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terminate 12 or not to terminate 13 the trust if the decision amounts
to an abuse of discretion. Nevertheless, the trustee is generally
given ample latitude in exercising his discretion. Except in clear
cases of abuse a court will not substitute its judgment for that
of the trustee. 4 While the court's holding in the instant case
indicates that the trustee's refusal to exercise its discretion to
terminate the trust was not so unreasonable as to constitute
an abuse of discretion, it apparently recognized the closeness of
the issue when it strongly suggested that the trustee should
exercise its discretion to terminate. 15
The court's refusal to order termination emphasizes a greater
reluctance to terminate a trust where nonsuccessive beneficiaries
are given the entire beneficial interest in the trust corpus as
compared to the situation where, as in Simmons, successive interests are created which subsequently merge. Where there are
successive interests it seems reasonable to conclude that the settlor's purpose in imposing the restrictions on the initial beneficiary was to conserve the remainder interest in the trust corpus.
If the life interest merges with the remainder interest the need
for continuing the trust restrictions ceases. On the other hand,
in the case of nonsuccessive beneficiaries, there is no remainder
interest to be protected. It therefore seems reasonable to presume that the testator's intent was to place the trust property
beyond the control of the beneficiaries. Consequently, the distinction drawn by the court between termination by successive
and nonsuccessive beneficiaries is a valid one, though the result
reached on the facts of the instant case may be a harsh one.
The Minnesota court then found that notwithstanding the
12. Cloket v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 52 F.2d 390 (8th Cir. 1931);
Conway v. Emeny, 139 Conn. 612, 96 A.2d 221 (1953); Woodward v.
Jolbert, 94 N.H. 324, 52 A.2d 641 (1947); In re Abert's Estate, 118 N.Y.S.
2d 864 (Sur. Ct. 1950).
13. Beede v. Old Colony Trust Co., 321 Mass. 115, 71 N.E.2d 882
(1947); Yeates v. Box, 198 Miss. 602, 22 So. 2d 411 (1945); In re Estate
of Roth, 154 Misc. 5, 276 N.Y.S. 435 (1934), afi'd, 244 App. Div. 791, 280
N.Y.S. 967 (1935). See In re Manahan's Estate, 255 Iowa 1060, 125
N.W.2d 135 (1963); RESTATEMAENT (SEcoND) TRUSTS § 334, comment d
(1959).

14. Pinckard v. Ledyard, 251 Ala. 648, 38 So. 2d 580 (1949); Damon
v. Damon, 312 Mass. 268, 44 N.E.2d 657 (1942); Scully v. Scully, 162
Neb. 368, 76 N.W.2d 239 (1956). This is also the rule in Minnesota.
In re Trusts under the Will of McCann, 212 Minn. 233, 3 N.W.2d 226
(1942); In re Trust of Watland, 211 Minn. 84, 300 N.W. 195 (1941); In re
Ordean's Will, 195 Minn. 120, 261 N.W. 706

(1935).

See Halbach,

Problems of Discretion in Discretionary Trusts, 61 CoLum. L. REv.
1425 (1961).

15.

275 Minn. at 78, 145 N.W.2d at 68.
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absence of any express provision regarding the remainder interest in the trust fund, the beneficiaries were entitled to the entire
beneficial interest in the trust fund 16 subject only to a postponement of enjoyment because of the trust provision providing them
with an annual payment. 17 In support of its holding that the
testator intended the total beneficial interest to pass, the court
noted that there were no residuary legatees of the estate other
than the trustee.'8 If the remainder interest did not go through
the trustee to the beneficiaries it would pass by intestacy. Such
a result would violate a presumptiort 9 against an intent by the
20
testator that any portion of his property pass by intestacy.
After deciding that the beneficiaries took the entire beneficial interest in the trust property, the court then sought to
determine the proper disposition of the trust property on the
death of one beneficiary. 2' The beneficiaries proposed the creation of separate accounts with the trust terminating as to each
beneficiary on his death, and the remainder in the account being
16. The problem is ascertaining and carrying out the donor's intent.
See G. BOGERT, TRusTs AND TRusTEEs § 182, at 230 (2d ed. 1965). The
Minnesota court followed the majority rule that where there is a gift of
income without an express or implied limitation as to time or amount
an intent to transfer the entire beneficial interest can be inferred.
Plymouth Congregational Church v. Young's Trustee, 299 S.W.2d 807
(Ky. 1957); Goodwin v. New England Trust Co., 321 Mass. 502, 73
N.E.2d 890 (1947); In re Roeser's Will, 1515 N.Y.S.2d 108 (Sur. Ct. 1956);
Ross v. Stiff, 47 Tenn. App. 355, 338 S.W.2d 244 (1960).
17. A literal application of MnvN. STAT. § 501.19 (1965) which
provides that "every estate and interest not embraced" in an express
trust and not "otherwise disposed of" reverts to the settlor or his estate,
would arguably have led to a different result. The court apparently
concluded that the construction of the will required the remainder to
pass under the trust instrument so that the statute was inapplicable.
18. 275 Minn. at 74, 145 N.W.2d at 65.
19. See In re Johnson's Estate, 233 Cal. App. 2d 785, 43 Cal. Rptr.
913 (1965); In re Tweedie's Will, 234 Minn. 444, 48 N.W.2d 657 (1951);
In re Estate of Briggs, 51 Misc. 2d 580, 273 N.Y.S.2d 590 (1966).
20. On the facts of this case, the court's holding that the entire
beneficial interest in the trust corpus passes to the beneficiaries is undoubtedly a correct one. The two beneficiaries are the testator's only
heirs at law (Brief for Respondent at 6) and would take the remainder
interest even if it were to pass by intestacy.
21. The court also faced the problem of properly allocating the
inheritance tax burden, since the trust instrument made no provision for
it. The court held that the inheritance taxes attributable to each beneficiary should be deducted from the first annual payment to that
beneficiary. It declined to order payment of the inheritance taxes
from the corpus because that would result in the survivor of the two
beneficiaries paying the entire tax. Nevertheless, the court declared
that the beneficiaries should be permitted to waive this inequity and
if each consents to payment of the other's tax from the corpus the
court will order the entire tax deducted from the corpus.
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paid over to the beneficiary's estate. The beneficiaries' argument that the testator's primary intent was to have them each
share equally in the trust fund was rejected by the court on the
ground that there is no authority for compelling a trustee to
create separate accounts where several beneficiaries are given
an equal interest in the entire trust property. 22 Instead, the
court held that on the death of one beneficiary the remainder
of the corpus should constitute a single fund for the surviving
beneficiary. Upon the death of the surviving beneficiary the
remainder of the corpus, if any, would be equally divided between the estates of the two beneficiaries. 2 3 This conclusion was
based upon the premise that the primary intent of the testator
was to provide the maximum annual stipend to each living beneficiary for as long as possible. 24 Any intent to benefit either beneficiary's estate was thought to be secondary. Therefore, the court
reasoned that its construction should be preferred to one which
in order to benefit
would more quickly terminate the 2payments
5
the estate of a deceased beneficiary.
Neither the reasoning of the beneficiaries nor that of the
court is entirely satisfactory. Had the testator been solely concerned with dividing the trust fund equally, as was contended
by the beneficiaries, he would probably have created two specific funds. The result reached by the court is also unsatisfactory,
even if the correctness of the court's assumption regarding the
22. However, it is frequently stated that courts will try to effectuate the intention of the settlor as expressed in the trust instrument.
If
E.g., In re Butler's Trusts, 223 Minn. 196, 26 N.W.2d 204 (1947).
creating separate accounts will effectuate the settlor's intent as inferred from the trust instrument, there seems to be no compelling
reason why separate accounts should not be established.
23. The court analogized its holding to the rule adopted by some
jurisdictions that cross remainders will be implied where, for example,
property is placed in trust with income payable to A and B during
their joint lives with the remainder passing to C on the death of both
A and B. Thus, if A dies, the presumption will be that the settlor
intended A's income interest to pass to B during B's life. See HartfordConnecticut Trust Co. v. Gowdy, 141 Conn. 546, 107 A.2d 409 (1954);
Kiesling v. White, 411 Ill. 493, 104 N.E.2d 291 (1952); Wachovia Bank &
Trust Co. v. Miller, 223 N.C. 1, 25 S.E.2d 177 (1943). These cases are
based upon a presumed intent by the testator to benefit the life beneficiary at the expense of the remainderman.
24. The court's premise is open to question since the trust instrument expressly allows the trustee to make annual payments to the
beneficiaries in any amount up to $2,000. Furthermore, the trustee is
given virtually unlimited discretion to terminate the trust. These provisions are inconsistent with an intent by the testator to assure the
continuation of the maximum annual payments for as long as possible.
25. 275 Minn. at 75, 145 N.W.2d at 65.
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testator's intent is accepted. Since the testator made no express
provision for the remainder interest in the trust fund, he probably assumed that the fund would be exhausted by the annual
payments to the beneficiaries and that each beneficiary would
receive half of the total trust fund through these annual payments. Therefore, it seems reasonable to conclude that along
with an intent to perpetuate the annual payments, the testator
also entertained a second, conflicting intent to treat the beneficiaries equally.28 Unless the two beneficiaries die simultaneously the court's construction will result in a greater portion
of the trust fund going to one beneficiary and his heirs than to
the other.
A preferable solution to the problem would be a modification
of the beneficiaries' proposal for the creation of separate accounts. Upon the death of one beneficiary the remainder of his
account should remain in trust while the stipends to the surviving beneficiary should continue to be deducted from the survivor's account. Upon the death of the surviving beneficiary,
the remaining corpus in each beneficiary's account should be
paid over to his estate. If during his lifetime, however, the surviving beneficiary should exhaust his share of the trust fund,
his stipend would then be deducted from the deceased beneficiary's account. This construction best reconciles what are inferred to be the testator's conflicting intents. Regardless of what
contingency occurs, the maximum stipends will continue to be
paid to each living beneficiary for the longest possible period of
time.

26. One commentator has stated that where there is doubt as to
the extent of each beneficiary's share, a construction of the trust instrument will be favored which will permit the beneficiaries to share
equally in the trust property, particularly where they are related to the
settlor in the same degree. G. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 182,
at 232 (2d ed. 1965). See Shaull v. United States, 161 F.2d 891 (D.C.
Cir. 1947); Biggs v. Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co., 273 Ky. 54, 115
S.W.2d 298 (1938); B.M.C. Durfee Trust Co. v. Borden, 329 Mass. 461,
109 N.E.2d 129 (1952); Fidelity Trust Co. v. Robert, 36 N.J. 561, 178
A.2d 185 (1962).

